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ABSTRACT
Single Transferable Vote (STV) is used in large political elections
around the world. It is easy to understand and has desirable norma-
tive properties such as clone-proofness. However, voters need to
report full rankings, which can make it less practical than plurality
voting. We study ways to minimize the amount of communication
required to use single-winner STV. In the first part of the paper,
voters are assumed to report their top-k alternatives in a single shot.
We empirically evaluate the extent to which STV with truncated
ballots approximates STV with full information. We also study the
computational complexity of the possible winner problem for top-k
ballots. For k = 1, it can be solved in polynomial time, but is NP-
complete when k > 2. In the second part, we consider interactive
communication protocols for STV. Building on a protocol proposed
by Conitzer and Sandholm (2005), we show how we can reduce
the amount of communication required in practice. We then study
empirically the average communication complexity of these pro-
tocols, based on randomly generated profiles, and on real-world
election data. Our conclusion is that STV needs, in practice, much
less information than in the worst case.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The world’s largest elections that allow voters to rank candidates
(and not just select the top choice) are probably the elections for the
Australian House of Representatives. Each of 150 districts sends a
representative, who is chosen by Single Transferable Vote (STV, also
known as instant runoff voting, see Sec. 2 for a definition). Voters
are asked to rank-order the candidates in their district. (Partial
rankings are not allowed.) While it would be easy to compute the
winner from electronic ballots, counting the paper ballots is a major
undertaking; in the 2016 elections, it took more than a week. Since
this makes for bad TV, the “two-party-preferred” heuristic is used to
quickly estimate the winner: officials guess which two candidates
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Taylor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 13–17, 2019,
Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
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Figure 1: In the Dublin election, most of the 43,942 voters
rank only 3 to 5 candidates out of 12.
are most likely to win, and the majority margin between these is
counted and reported. In this paper, we think about better ways
to handle STV elections, that can find the election winner quickly
enough for TV, and that do not require voters to give full rankings.
In many legislatures, such as for the Irish presidential elections,
voters are allowed to only submit a partial ranking: they rank a
subset of the candidates, and leave the rest unranked. If all ranked
candidates are eliminated by STV, the vote is then ‘exhausted’ and ig-
nored during further counting. The freedom to give partial rankings
is popular with voters. In the 2002 elections in Dublin, for which full
ballot data is available, most voters chose to rank between 3 and 5 of
the 12 candidates, with only 8% of voters submitting a full ranking
(see Fig. 1). We ask: Are such partial ballots sufficient to correctly
identify the STV winner? To do so, we sample random profiles of
full rankings and truncate the rankings so that voters only rank
their top-k choices. We then compute the probability that the STV
winner of the top-k ballots is the same as the STV winner of the
full ballots. Even for small k , we find that top-k ballots are enough
to identify the correct winner quite frequently, especially for data
taken from real elections. We also test empirically the sensitivity
of STV to cloning when given truncated ballots.
As specified, STV ignores exhausted votes, which implicitly as-
sumes that voters are indifferent between all unranked candidates.
If we were to make fewer assumptions, we would want to compute
all possible winners of STV, given top-k ballots. (A candidate is a
possible winner if it wins for some way of completing the partial
ballots into full rankings.) A problem with this proposal is that it is
not clear how to efficiently decide which candidates are possible
winners. Indeed, we show that the problem is NP-complete, even for
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top-2 ballots. On the other hand, we show that the problem is fixed-
parameter tractable when there are few voters or few candidates.
When given top-1 ballots (that is, we only know the plurality scores
of the candidates), we give a simple characterization of the set of
possible winners, which also yields a polynomial-time algorithm.
Suppose we are not happy to merely approximate the true STV
winner. Another way to lower the workload for voters is to allow
interactive communication protocols, that can ask voters for more
information in an adaptive fashion. In 2005, Conitzer and Sandholm
[6] studied such protocols for several common voting rules that
take rankings as input. They found that, asymptotically and in
the worst case, for many popular rules (such as Borda, Copeland,
and ranked pairs) we cannot do better than to ask for the entire
ranking outright. This can be annoying to voters (as it is to many
Australians), and costly. In contrast, Conitzer and Sandholm [6]
found a natural communication protocol for STV where the average
voter only needs to name a logarithmic number of candidates. The
Conitzer–Sandholm (CS) protocol begins by asking each voter for
their top candidate. Based on this information, the candidate with
the lowest plurality score is eliminated. The protocol then asks the
supporters of this candidate for their next-most-preferred choice.
The key insight is that only a small minority of voters can be
supporters of the eliminated candidate (by choice of that candidate);
indeed at most n/m supporters are possible, where n andm are the
total number of voters and of remaining candidates. Repeating the
elimination process, we see that in total we ask at most nm +
n
m−1 +
· · · + n2 ≈ n · logm many questions during the elimination phase.1
Can this protocol be improved? We do not offer an alternative
with a better worst-case guarantee,2 but we propose a protocol
that needs less communication in practice, and that never requires
more communication than the CS protocol. Our protocol first asks
voters for their initial top choices. Then, we identify a set of can-
didates that can safely be eliminated simultaneously. This avoids
querying the same voter many times in a row, if that voter likes
many niche candidates. This basic idea (slightly adapted to handle
tie-breaking issues) allows for lower communication cost, on both
random profiles and on real election data. On data from Australian
elections, we find that many candidates are necessary losers, and
can therefore immediately be eliminated, giving a more rigorous
alternative to the current two-party-preferred heuristic.
Related work. The chapter by Boutilier and Rosenschein [4]
provides background on work on incomplete information and com-
munication in voting. Research on the communication complexity
of STV was initiated by Conitzer and Sandholm [6]. Kalech et al.
[13] consider a communication protocol where voters are repeat-
edly queried about their next preferred candidate; they do not study
STV. Lu and Boutilier [15, 16] and Dery et al. [8] also study elici-
tation protocols based on top-k ballots. Adams et al. [21] consider
the communication complexity of determining approximate win-
ners for rules based on scores. Using truncated ballots as a way of
1The existence of this protocol explains why counting STV elections on paper is feasible
in the first place. We can view a paper ballot as an agent who is costly to ‘communicate’
with. First sort the papers intom physcial stacks according to top-ranked candidate.
The Conitzer–Sandholm analysis shows that, to find the election winner, we only need
to touch each ballotO (logm) times on average while redistributing.
2Conitzer and Sandholm [6] show that their protocol requiresO (n(logm)2) bits of
communication, and they prove a lower bound of Ω(n logm) using fooling sets.
reducing the amount of information has also been considered in
[2, 19, 20, 22]. Filmus and Oren [10] study experimentally, using
impartial culture, how often one can find the Borda or Copeland
winner when only given top-k ballots.
Freeman et al. [11] gave an axiomatic characterization of STV as
a social welfare function. They show that STV is the only rule in a
family of iterative elimination rules that satisfies clone-proofness
[23]. STV is NP-hard to manipulate, even for one voter [1], although
this worst-case result does not seem to hold in the average case
[14, 24]. Winner determination for the parallel-universe version of
STV isNP-hard; however, recent work by Jiang et al. [12] shows that
heuristic search algorithms perform very well in practice. Winner
determination for the immediate-tie-breaking version of STV is in
P; but it is P-complete and thus hard to parallelize efficiently [7].
Outline. Section 2 gives background on voting. Section 3 defines
the k-truncated approximation of STV and evaluates it empirically.
Section 4 studies the possible winner problem for STV given k-
truncated ballots. Section 5 focuses on communication protocols.
2 PRELIMINARIES
An election is a triple E = (N ,A, P) where N = {1, ...,n} is a set of
voters, A is a set of candidates, with |A| =m; and P = (≻1, ..., ≻n ) is
a (preference) profile, which specifies a linear order ≻i over A for
each voter i ∈ N . If a ≻i b, then voter i is said to strictly prefer
candidate a over b. A (resolute) voting rule is a function f : E 7→ A
which for each election outputs a single winning candidate.
Given a prespecified linear order ◃ over the candidates, called
tie-breaking priority, the STV◃ rule proceeds in (up tom−1) rounds.
(We will usually write STV for short, leaving ◃ implicit.) In each
round, the candidate with the smallest number of voters rank-
ing them first is eliminated (using tie-breaking if necessary),3 and
the votes who supported it now support their preferred candidate
among those that remain. More formally, given a profile P and a
candidate x ∈ A, we write S(x) for the number of voters in P who
rank x on top (the plurality score of x in P ). STV is defined recur-
sively as follows: If |A| = 1, then the unique candidate is the winner.
Otherwise, select a candidate x ∈ A with minimum plurality score
S(x) (taking x to be least-priority according to◃ if there are several
plurality losers), construct the profile P ′ by removing x from all
votes in P , and then recursively run STV on P ′.
3 APPROXIMATING STVWITH TRUNCATED
BALLOTS
In this section, we consider one-shot protocols where all input in-
formation needs to be gathered at the same time. In this model, if
we wish to compute the STV -winner with certainty, we need to ask
voters to report their entire preferences, i.e., to report their linear
order. Let us relax the goal of certainty and instead aim to compute
the STV -winner with high-enough probability. In exchange, we ask
for less information: Voters report top-k-ballots for a fixed k > 1,
i.e., they report a ranked list of their k most-preferred candidates.
3This way of breaking ties in STV is called immediate tie-breaking. The parallel universe
version [5] of STV will not be considered here.
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3.1 The rule STV k
We first define a version of STV which takes top-k ballots as input.
This generalization of STV is natural and quite popular. It is used,
for example, in local elections in San Francisco (with k = 3). The
analogous rule that allows submitting partial rankings of any length
(not fixed to some k) is also widely used, for example in Ireland.
For each 1 6 k 6 m, we define STVk as follows: Just like STV ,
in each round, we eliminate a candidate ranked first by the smallest
number of voters (breaking ties using ◃ if necessary). If all the k
candidates in some ballot have been eliminated, the vote is ignored
in later rounds (and is called exhausted). We repeat this process
until one candidate remains, who is the winner according to STVk .
Example 1. Let A = {a,b, c,d, e} and consider the following 21
top-2 ballots: 6 votes a ≻ e , 5 votes d ≻ e , 4 votes c ≻ e and 6 votes
b ≻ c , with tie-breaking priority a ◃ b ◃ c ◃ d ◃ e . Under STV 2,
e is eliminated first, then c . The votes c ≻ e are now exhausted. d is
eliminated next; a and b are then tied, and a is the winner.
Although STVk can be seen as a voting rule on its own, we view
it as an approximation of STV . In this context, we take STVk to be a
rule which takes profiles of full linear orders as input, truncates the
preferences to become top-k ballots, and then proceeds as above.
(Hence, STV 1 is the plurality rule, and STVm−1 and STVm are just
STV .) We will ask: How often do STVk and STV declare the same
candidate to be the winner?
For this we start by defining voting distributions on which our
study will be based. We focus on the Mallows ϕ model [17] because
of its flexibility and ability to represent a wide class of preferences.
We will also discuss experiments using real-world data sets.
When a voting rule is defined via the maximization of a score,
it makes sense to measure the quality of its approximations using
score ratios. However, STV is not based on score maximization (for
a discussion, see [5]). Thus, we measure the quality of approxima-
tion by the frequency with which the approximation outputs the
true winner. Our main practical objective is to obtain, depending
on the context, a value of k small enough to allow for painless com-
munication of preferences, but large enough so that the probability
of obtaining the true winner from STVk is high.
3.2 Evaluation of the Accuracy of STVk
To experimentally measure the probability that the STVk -winner
coincides with the true STV -winner, we repeatedly do the following:
(1) Generate a complete profile P with n voters andm candidates.
(2) For k = 1 tom − 1: compare STVk (P) to STV (P).
The details of step (1) depend on whether we are in the random
generation setting or the real world data setting. For the former,
we sample a profile from a given distribution. For the latter, we
randomly generate a profile, by selecting n votes uniformly at ran-
dom from the collection of votes found in the data set. These two
steps are then iterated a sufficient number of times so as to obtain
meaningful results. Iterating this process a number of times allows
us to evaluate the quality of STVk for different values of k .
3.2.1 Mallows ϕ. The Mallows ϕ-model [17] is a probability
distributions over rankings, parameterized by a reference ranking
σ and a dispersion parameter ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. For any ranking r , the
probability of selecting r given σ and ϕ is
P (r ;σ ,ϕ) = 1Z ϕd (r ,σ ),
where d is the Kendall tau distance and
Z =
∑
r ′ ϕ
d (r ,σ ) = 1 · (1 + ϕ) · · · · · (1 + ϕ + · · · + ϕm−1)
is a normalization constant. For small values of ϕ, the mass is
concentrated around σ , while ϕ = 1 gives the uniform distribution
impartial culture (IC), where all profiles are equiprobable.
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Figure 2: Probability that STVk coincides with STV: Mallows
ϕ model withm = 7 and n = 100.
We present simulation results with m = 7 and n = 100, and
let ϕ vary. For each experiment, we draw 1000 random profiles.
We simulate the elicitation of top-k (k ∈ {1 . . . 6}) preferences for
n = 100 with ϕ ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. Figure 2 shows the probabilities
that STVk correctly selects the STV -winner. For small ϕ = 0.7, we
see that the STV -winner is correctly selected with high probability
when k is at least 3 or 4. For larger ϕ, the accuracy is much lower.
For impartial culture (ϕ = 1), the success rate is 82% (resp. 91%)
when considering top-4 (resp. top-5) truncated ballots. In general,
when ϕ < 1, the accuracy of STVk improves significantly if the
number of voters is increased.
3.2.2 Real Election Data. We use data sets from Preflib [18].
Most of them contain some incomplete ballots. Since we need full
ballots to run our experiments, we excluded all partial ballots. The
data sets used are the following, with the number of voters and of
alternatives in parentheses: Sushi (5000,10), Dublin (3662,12), ERS
(43,10), Glasgow City Council (548,9), and Debian (327,7). Except for
Sushi, all these data sets were obtained from elections where voters
knew that STV would be used to count their votes. This makes it
more likely that our conclusions will hold for future STV elections.
For each of these data sets, we find that STVk converges quickly
to the correct prediction with 100% accuracy for each fixed value of
k , as n increases. Now, we are interested in predicting the result for
small and large elections. We consider Dublin data (withm = 12
candidates), where we sample n∗ voters among the n available
votes (n∗ < n). We start with n∗ = 10 and increment the number
of voters in steps of 10. In each experiment, 1000 random profiles
are constructed with n∗ voters; then we consider the top-k ballots
obtained from these profiles, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and we compute
the probability of selecting the correct winner (the winner of the
complete profile of the n∗ sampled votes). Figure 3 shows results
for Dublin data with small elections (n∗ ∈ {10, ..., 100}) and large
elections (n∗ ∈ {110, ..., 1500}).
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Figure 3: Probability that STVk coincides with STV on
Dublin data: varying k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and n∗ (n∗ < n).
Our results suggest that predicting the correct winner with a
small number of voters fails rather often when k is too small (k 6
1
4m). For instance, when k = 3 and n
∗ = 100, the correct winner is
predicted only with frequency 87%. We also see that performance
increases with the number of voters. Indeed, eliciting only one
candidate for each voter (k = 1) is sufficient to predict the correct
winner when n∗ > 1120. Obviously, increasing the value of k leads
to a decrease in the number of voters needed for correct winner
selection with 100% accuracy: for instance, when k = 16m (resp.
k = 14m) over 12 candidates, n
∗ > 830 (resp. n∗ > 710) are needed
to always output the correct result.
3.3 STVk and Resistance to Cloning
Tideman [23] introduced the notion of independence of clones, which
requires a voting rule to be robust to the introduction of similar can-
didates. Notably, while most voting rules fail Tideman’s condition,4
the parallel-universe version of STV satisfies it, and the resolute
version essentially satisfies it as well (see below). In this section, we
study empirically to what extent STVk stays clone-proof. Now, for
k = 1, STV1 coincides with plurality, which is highly sensitive to
cloning, while STVm−1 is clone-proof. What happens in between?
Let us make the notion of clone-proofness formal. Given a can-
didate x , introduce a new set of candidates X ′ called clones of x .
Let A′ = (A \ {x}) ∪X ′. A ranking ≻′ over A′ is compatible with a
ranking ≻ over A if all elements of X ′ are ranked contiguously in
≻′. A profile P ′ = (≻′1, . . . , ≻′n ) over A′ is compatible with a profile
P = (≻1, . . . , ≻n ) over A if for every i , ≻′i is compatible with ≻i . A
(possibly irresolute) voting rule is clone-proof if, given a profile P
and a profile P ′ compatible with P , x is a winner in P if and only
if one of the clones of x is a winner in P , and for any y , x , y is a
winner in P if and only if it is a winner in P ′.
The resolute version of STV with immediate tie-breaking is clone-
proof, provided that tie-breaking is consistent with cloning: Let P be
a profile over A, and P ′ a profile over A′ = A \ {x} ∪X ′ compatible
with P . Take a tie-breaking relation ◃ over A, and suppose ◃′
over A′ is compatible with ◃. In this case, if STV◃(P) = x then
STV◃′(P ′) ∈ X ′, and if STV◃(P) = y , x then STV◃′(P ′) = y.
In order to evaluate the resistance of STVk to cloning, we propose
an empirical approach where we clone the winner and we measure
experimentally the probability that cloning significantly changes
the outcome. (We clone the winner because cloning a different
4Notable exceptions are Ranked Pairs and Schulze. Approval voting and range voting
can also be seen as clone-proof, though they do not use rankings.
candidate rarely changes the result.) For doing so we repeatedly
generate a complete profile P (with n voters andm candidates), and
then for each k ∈ {1, . . .m} (a) we construct a profile P ′ obtained
from P by cloning the winner (note that there arem + 1 candidates
in P ′), and (b) we compare STVk (P) to STVk (P ′). These steps are
iterated a sufficient number of times to obtain meaningful results.
Example 2. Let P contain 4 votes a ≻ c ≻ b, 3 votes b ≻ a ≻ c ,
and 2 votes c ≻ b ≻ a. The STV2 (= STV ) winner is b. Let us clone
b to {b,b ′}. A compatible profile P ′ is {4 : a ≻ c ≻ b ′ ≻ b, 3 : b ≻
b ′ ≻ a ≻ c, 2 : c ≻ b ′ ≻ b ≻ a}. For k = 2, the k-truncated profile is
{4 : a ≻ c, 3 : b ≻ b ′, 2 : c ≻ b ′} and the STV2 winner is a.
3.3.1 Mallows ϕ. For each experiment we draw 1000 profiles.
We present simulation results for small and large elections when
m = 5 as we vary ϕ. We simulate the elicitation of top-k preferences
where k ∈ {1, . . . , 5} for n ∈ {30, 500} with ϕ ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}.
We compute the probability that, after we clone the STVk winner,
one of the clones still wins under STVk (Figure 4). Unsurprisingly,
resistance to cloning increases rapidly with k and decreases with ϕ.
Also, it significantly increases with the number of voters.
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Figure 4: Resistance to cloning: Mallows ϕ model.
3.3.2 Real Data. We test the resistance of STVk to cloning using
Dublin data with samples of n∗ voters among n (n∗ < n) where
n∗ = {100, 1000} then we clone the STVk winner (Figure 5). In each
experiment 1000 random profiles are constructed with n∗ voters.
Consistently with the above experiments, STVk often fails clone-
proofness for small k . Again, resistance to cloning increases rapidly
with k , even more rapidly than with randomly generated profiles.
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Figure 5: Resistance to cloning: real data.
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4 POSSIBLE WINNERS WITH TOP-k BALLOTS
When votes are only partially known, the correct winning candidate
can in general not be determined. We can express our incomplete
information using the concept of possible winners.
Formally, a partial profile is a collection (R1, . . . ,Rn ) of partial
orders over the candidates A. A completion of a partial profile is
a profile (≻1, . . . , ≻n ) of linear orders such that ≻i extends Ri for
each i = 1, . . . ,n. Then, given a partial profile, a candidate c is a
possible winner of STV if there exists a completion of the partial
profile such that c is the STV -winner of that completion.
It is known that it is NP-complete to decide whether a given
candidate is a possible winner for STV in a given partial profile.
This follows immediately from the NP-completeness of constructive
manipulation for STV [1] which is equivalent to the possible winner
problem with a profile where n − 1 votes are fully specified, but we
do not have any information about the last vote. While this case is
known to be hard, the complexity of the possible winner problem
for STV has not been studied for other ‘shapes’ of partial profiles.
A particularly intuitive way of expressing partial preferences is
to use truncated ballots. Given k 6m, a top-k ballot is a linear order
of k among them candidates. A top-k profile is a collection of n top-
k ballots. In this section, we study the possible winner problem for
STV with top-k ballots for fixed k > 1. We show that the problem
is polynomial-time computable if k = 1, but that it is NP-complete
for each fixed k > 2. However, the problem is fixed-parameter
tractable for profiles that have few voters or few candidates.
4.1 Possible Winners with Top-1 ballots
The next result gives a closed-form characterization of possible
winners for STV. This condition (without tie-breaking) was also
considered (without proof) in [12] as a reduction technique for com-
puting parallel universe STV cowinners using search algorithms.
Proposition 1. Let P be a top-1 profile over A. Let S(x) be the
plurality score of x in P , that is, the number of votes in P ranking x
on top. Relabel candidates so that S(x1) 6 S(x2) 6 · · · 6 S(xm ), and
such that if S(xi ) = S(xi+1) then xi+1 ◃ xi . Then xi is a possible win-
ner for STV◃ if there is no j > i such that either S(x j ) > ∑j−1s=1 S(xs ),
or S(x j ) = ∑j−1s=1 S(xs ) and j ◃ i .
Proof. Assume there is a j > i such that S(x j ) > ∑j−1s=1 S(xs ), or
S(x j ) = ∑j−1s=1 S(xs ) and j ◃ i . Then, there is no way for xi to avoid
eliminating before x j , because it can only benefit from the transfers
from the votes that initially support xs for s < j.
For the converse, consider any completion Q of P where xi is
ranked second in every vote whose top is not xi . Assume there is a
step where xi is eliminated, and let j be the smallest index such that
j , i and such that x j has not been eliminated yet at that stage. The
votes supporting x j are only those S(x j ) that supported it initially.
Since all candidates xs with s < j and s , i have been eliminated,
their votes have all been transferred to xi , and thus xi has exactly∑j−1
s=1 S(xs ) supporting votes. Since xi is eliminated before x j , either∑j−1
s=1 S(xs ) < S(x j ), or
∑j−1
s=1 S(xs ) = S(x j ) and j ◃ i . 
Example 3. Let P be such that S(x1) = 1, S(x2) = 2, S(x3) = 4,
S(x4) = 6 and S(x5) = 12. The possible winners are x3, x4, x5.
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Figure 6: In most divisions in recent elections for the Aus-
tralianHouse ofRepresentatives, therewere only one or two
possible winners, given plurality scores.
If a candidate is not a possible winner, it must be a necessary
loser. It turns out that in real STV elections, we can identify many
necessary losers, even if we only know the plurality scores. Figure 6
shows the number of possiblewinners in elections for theAustralian
House of Representatives, for which plurality scores are publicly
available for each of the 150 districts (‘divisions’) in each election
year. We can see that in most divisions, there is only 1 possible
winner (because they received a majority of first-place votes), or
there are 2 possible winners (usually from the two major parties).
It is very uncommon for there to be 3 or more possible winners.
Using Proposition 1, one can find the possible winners for STV
given top-1 ballots in polynomial time. The complementary notion
of necessary winner (i.e., a candidate who wins for all completions
of the partial profile), is easily characterized: candidate x is the nec-
essary winner iff it is top-ranked by a majority of voters (assuming
n is odd; the characterization for even n depends on tie-breaking).
4.2 Possible Winners with Top-2 ballots
Now we show that the positive result for top-1 ballots does not
extend to larger values of k : the possible STV-winner problem for
top-k ballots is NP-complete, even for k = 2.
Proposition 2. The possible STV -winner problem is NP-complete
given top-2 truncated ballots.
Proof. We reduce from 3-SAT, restricted to formulas in which
each clause has exactly 3 literals, and each literal occurs exactly
twice. Let φ be such a 3CNF formula, with clausesC = {c1, . . . , cm }
and variable set X = {x1, . . . , xn }. Let L = X ∪ X be the set of
literals. Let ε := 1/1000nm. We construct a preference profile with
alternative set A = {c,w} ∪C ∪ L. In specifying the profile, we use
fractional voters to make the argument easier to follow, but we can
translate this to integer numbers by multiplying all multiplicities
by 1/ε2. Introduce the following voters:
100 × c ≻ w ≻ · · ·
99 × w ≻ c ≻ · · ·
99 − ε × c j ≻ w ≻ · · · for each clause c j ∈ C
60 × ℓ ≻ ℓ ≻ · · · for each literal ℓ ∈ L
2ε × ℓ ≻ c j ≻ · · · for each occurrence of ℓ ∈ L in c j ∈ C
ε2 × · ≻ · ≻ · · · for each variable x ∈ X
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The dots in the last type of voter indicate dummy alternatives
that only appear in those positions (and will immediately be elim-
inated). The value ε is chosen so that the total weight of order-ε
voters is less than 1, and the total weight of order-ε2 voters is less
than ε . We wish to know if alternative c is a possible STV winner.
Suppose there is a satisfying assignment to the variables; for
each variable xi ∈ X , let ℓi be the literal that is set true. Consider
any completion of the above profile such that
100 × c ≻ w ≻ · · ·
99 × w ≻ c ≻ · · ·
99 − ε × c j ≻ w ≻ c ≻ · · · for each clause c j ∈ C
60 × ℓ ≻ ℓ ≻ c ≻ · · · for each literal ℓ ∈ L
2ε × ℓ ≻ c j ≻ c ≻ · · · for each occurrence of ℓ ∈ L in c j ∈ C
ε2 × · ≻ · ≻ ℓi ≻ · · · for each variable x ∈ X
After eliminating nameless dummy alternatives, true literals ℓi have
the lowest score 60+4ε (false literals have score 60+4ε+ε2). So in the
next n rounds, the true literals are eliminated. Since the assignment
satisfies all clauses, the scores of the remaining alternatives are:
c : 100 w : 99 c j : >99 + ε ℓi : >120.
Thus,w is eliminated next, and its votes are transferred to c , giving
it a score of 199. Then all the c j are eliminated, again transferring
votes to c . Finally, false literals ℓi are eliminated, transferring (all
but perhaps ε2 many) votes to c . Hence, c wins.
For the other direction, suppose the formula is unsatisfiable. We
show that c is not an STV winner for any completion of the profile.
At first, the unnamed dummy alternatives are eliminated. In each
of the next n rounds, the alternative with the lowest score (between
60 and 61) is a literal. So in these rounds, a selection of n literals are
eliminated. Note that once we eliminate literal ℓ, the alternative ℓ
has plurality score greater than 120, and so ℓ will not be eliminated
in these n rounds. Thus, the n eliminated literals describe a valid
assignment to the variables which sets all eliminated literals to true.
Because the formula is unsatisfiable, there is a clause c j which is
not satisfied by this assignment. Thus, c j did not have any order-ε
votes transferred to it, so has score < 99. So in the next round
c j (or another unsatisfied clause) is eliminated, and its votes are
transferred to w , so that w now has a score of more than 197. In
the nextm − 1 steps, either c is eliminated (and we are done), or all
other clause candidates are eliminated, since they all have scores of
< 101, while the remaining literals have a score of at least 120. Each
time a clause is eliminated, the score ofw rises. After all clauses are
eliminated, c still has a score between 100 and 101, so c is eliminated
next. Sincew still remains, c is not an STV winner. 
It is easy to extend the above reduction to top-k ballots for fixed
k > 3, by introducing extra dummy candidates in second position,
which will immediately be eliminated.
While the possible winner problem is NP-complete, it is fixed-
parameter tractable if there are few voters, or few candidates.
Proposition 3. The possible STV◃-winner problem for top-k bal-
lots is in FPT with respect to the number of voters n, and is in FPT
with respect to the number of candidatesm.
Proof. Number of voters n. Note that at most n different candi-
dates can appear in top position, and so STV, run on any completion
of the profile, will immediately eliminate all candidates that are
never in top position. So we may assume that there are at most n
candidates overall. This allows us to iterate over all possible com-
pletions of the profile (there are at most (n!)n many) in FPT time,
and then run STV on the completion to obtain a possible winner.
Number of candidatesm. For this, we formulate the problem as
in integer linear program with a number of variables bounded as a
function ofm. By Lenstra’s theorem, it follows that the problem is
in FPT. We omit the details due to space constraints. As a sketch, the
program contains, for each of them! possible preference rankings ≻,
a variable m≻ indicating how many votes are completed to this
ranking. Constraints ensure that these variables describe a valid
completion of the input profile. Then, we use additional variables
and constraints to compute the STV winner of the completion, in a
way similar to the STV-ILP presented in [12]. 
5 COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS FOR STV
We now take a different path: we consider the determination of
the STV winner for the complete profile, and consider interactive
protocols where voters may report their preferences incrementally,
when the central authority asks them to do so.
5.1 Conitzer and Sandholm’s Protocol
Conitzer and Sandholm [6] studied the communication complexity
of several voting rules, by giving specific protocols and by prov-
ing lower bounds obtained via fooling sets. For the case of STV,
they showed a lower bound on the communication complexity of
Ω(n logm), which is the cost of communicating every voter’s top
choice. They were able to match this lower bound up to a log factor
using the following protocol for STV, which we call P1.
Protocol 1: P1
1 for each voter i ∈ N do
2 ask i to send the name of her top candidate
3 repeat
4 d ← candidate ranked first by the fewest voters (breaking ties)
5 Remove d from the set of available candidates
6 for each voter i ∈ N do
7 if the top candidate of i was d then
8 ask i to send the name of her next preferred candidate
9 until there exists a candidate c ranked first by a majority of voters
10 return c
Example 4. Let A = {a,b, c,d} and P = {3 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻
b, 3 : c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d, 1 : d ≻ b ≻ a ≻ c, 1 : b ≻ d ≻ c ≻ a}
with tie-breaking priority a ◃ b ◃ c ◃ d . We run P1. In the first
round, d is eliminated. We ask the voter who supports d to name her
next preferred candidate. We get P = {3 : a, 3 : c, 2 : b}. Next, b is
eliminated. We ask the two voters supporting b for their next preferred
candidate. We get P = {4 : a, 4 : c}. By tie-breaking, a wins.
Conitzer and Sandholm [6] show that P1 requires communication
of at mostO(n(logm)2) bits. To see this, note that at a step where k
candidates remain, at most nk voters rank the eliminated candidate
first. Thus, the number of times we need to ask voters for their new
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favorite is at most nm +
n
m−1 + . . . +n, which is bounded by n logm.
We can actually say something more precise: the worst case occurs
when, in each step, all candidates are tied for elimination; in this
case, when k candidates remain, exactly mk voters will send logk
bits, and this goes on until k = 1. This gives an exact worst case
cost of n
(
logm +
∑m−1
k=1
logk
k+1
)
bits. In the subsequent discussion,
we will not focus on the number of bits transmitted, and instead
will count how often voters have to report their favorite remaining
candidate. We refer to this as the number of questions asked. It is
easy to see that, in the worst-case, for fixed n andm, the number
of questions asked by protocol P1 is PWorst = n ·
(
1 +
∑m−1
k=1
1
(k+1)
)
.
5.2 An Improved Protocol
At each step in the execution of the protocol, the central authority
has partial knowledge of the votes. Therefore, it makes sense to
identify those candidates that can still win (the possible winners)
and those that cannot (the necessary losers). This is especially
useful when interaction with the voters takes time: assume that the
vote is about a meeting date; the execution of the protocol can take
several days (due to some voters reacting slowly to their emails). If
at some point in the execution of the protocol, we know that for
sure the meeting will not be on November 22 nor November 24,
this is useful information for voters, who can plan something else
on these two days, and for the central authority, which does not
have to pre-book a room for these days.
We start by noticing that at each step of the protocol P1, the
information known by the protocol is essentially a top-1 profile.
Therefore, Proposition 1 is applicable and we can calculate, at each
step of the protocol, the remaining possible winners and necessary
losers. Knowing the possible winners (and the necessary losers) at
each step of the protocol is useful information, but it turns out that
eliminating a candidate as soon as it becomes a necessary loser can
change the final outcome:
Example 5. Let us consider P = {5 : c ≻ a ≻ d ≻ e ≻ b, 1 : a ≻
e ≻ b ≻ d ≻ c, 2 : e ≻ b ≻ d ≻ a ≻ c, 2 : b ≻ a ≻ e ≻ c ≻ d}, and
let the tie-breaking priority be a ◃ b ◃ c ◃ d ◃ e . The winner for
P is c . The necessary losers given top-1 ballots are a, d and e . If we
eliminate those three candidates, the winner is b.
The source of the paradox lies in the tie between the initial score
of c and the cumulative score of a, b, d , and e . However, we now
identify a subset of necessary losers that can always be eliminated
without changing the winner.
Let us rename the candidates so that they are ranked by increas-
ing order of plurality score, then by tie-breaking priority: for each
i , either S(xi ) < S(xi+1), or S(xi ) = S(xi+1) and xi+1 has priority
over xi . We say that xi is dominant if either S(xi ) > ∑i−1j=1 S(x j ),
or S(xi ) = ∑i−1j=1 S(x j ) and xi has priority over x j , where j is the
largest index smaller than i such that x j is a dominant candidate.
Note that to check whether xi is dominant, we need to iterate over
all candidates x j , j < i . We say that x j is a strong necessary loser if
there is an index i > j such that xi is dominant. By Proposition 1, a
strong necessary loser is a necessary loser, but the converse is not
always true: in Example 5, only d and a are strong necessary losers.
Proposition 4. The removal of strong necessary losers does not
change the winner.
Proof. Assume xi is the largest dominant candidate in the se-
quence (x1, . . . , xi−1 are thus the strong necessary losers). Then
no matter in which order the candidates x1, . . . , xi−1 are elimi-
nated, theywill all be eliminated before all candidates in {xi , ..., xm }.
Therefore, after i − 1 elimination steps, the currently eliminated
candidates are exactly x1, . . . , xi−1. Eliminating them directly allows
to “jump” over i − 1 elimination steps, and the rest of the process
continues exactly as if this jump had not been performed. 
Protocol P1 can be improved by checking at each step if there
are strong necessary losers, and if so, eliminate them in addition to
the current loser, and then send a query to all voters whose current
top candidate has just been eliminated. A further improvement is
possible by querying one voter at a time: it might be possible to
rule out further candidates without knowing every voters’ current
top choice. To do this we need to generalize the notion of dominant
candidate and strong necessary loser to incomplete plurality profiles,
where the top candidate of some voters may be unknown. An in-
complete plurality profile is given by the numbers (s∅, sx1 , . . . , sxm ),
where s∅ is the number of voters for whom we do not know what
their top candidate is, and sxi are the number of voters for whom
we know that xi is their top candidate.
Assume again that candidates are renamed so that they are
ranked by increasing order of plurality score, then by tie-breaking
priority. A candidate xi is a safe necessary loser (SNL) if there is
j > i such that sx j > s∅ + sx1 + · · · + sx j−1 . Clearly, if xi is a safe
necessary loser for an incomplete plurality profile then it is a strong
necessary loser for every of its completions into a plurality profile,
which implies that eliminating an SNL candidate cannot change
the winner. This leads us to define the following protocol:
Protocol 2: P2
1 Query every voters’ top candidate
2 Let (s∅, sx1 , . . . , sxm ) be the resulting plurality profile, with
s∅ = 0
3 repeat
4 for each safe necessary loser xi do
5 Remove xi
6 s∅ ← s∅ + sxi
7 Select an empty voter and query their new top alternative
8 Let x j be this new top alternative
9 sxj ← sxj + 1; s∅ ← s∅ − 1
10 until the set of possible winners is a singleton
The protocol terminates because at each step, either a candidate is
removed, or s∅ is decreased by 1. If s∅ queries are made successively
without any candidate being removed, then s∅ reaches 0 and then
there is at least one SNL (the current plurality loser with lowest
priority). The winner returned at the end of the protocol is the STV
winner because removing SNLs does not influence the winner. It
can be proven that P2 is as least as cheap as P1, in the sense that no
voter is queried more often with P2 than with P1.
Example 5.1. Let the candidates be a,b, c,d, e . After the first step,
the plurality scores are (sa : 1, sb : 1, sc : 3, sd : 4, se : 8). a and b are
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SNL and are removed. The resulting incomplete plurality profile is
(s∅ : 2, c : 3,d : 4, e : 8). We query a voter who votes for d , giving
(s∅ : 1, sc : 3, sd : 5, se : 8). c is now a SNL and is removed, giving
(s∅ : 4, sd : 5, se : 8). We query a voter who votes for e , resulting in
(s∅ : 3, sd : 5, se : 9). d is now an SNL, and the winner is e .
5.3 Evaluation of the Protocols
This section evaluates the average communication complexity of
P1 and P2. We discuss experiments using the Mallows ϕ model and
real data. Our objective is to determine the average communication
complexity, in terms of the number of questions voters need to
answer on average. Note that, for plurality elections, this number is
1, while for (say) Borda elections, this number ism in the worst-case.
We find that STV only asks 2 or 3 questions for each voter when
m = 7, or in the Dublin election data.
5.3.1 Mallows ϕ. For each experiment, we draw 1000 random
profiles. In the first set of experiments, we present simulation results
withm = 7 and n = 100, and let ϕ vary. We count the number of
questions asked by P1 and P2 with ϕ ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. Figure 7
shows the average communication cost of P1, P2 and compares it
to PWorst, the worst-case cost of P1.
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Figure 7: Average communication cost, Mallows.
Results suggest that in practice, that both P1 and P2 ask fewer
questions than in the worst case (PWorst). P2 asks fewer questions
than P1 for all parameter values, but the difference is more signif-
icant for lower ϕ. When ϕ = 1, more information is needed from
voters under both P1 and P2, and the savings of P2 are smaller.
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Figure 8: Average number of voters who were asked k ques-
tions, Mallows
To better understand the difference in the behavior of P1 and
P2, we also plot, for each k , how many voters needed to answer k
questions, see Fig. 8. The numbers shown are averages over profiles
with n = 100,m = 7 and ϕ ∈ {0.7, 1}, taken over 1000 samples. The
results show that, compared to P1, P2 often only needs to ask a voter
for their top alternative, and then never asks another question.
5.3.2 Real Data. Figure 9 shows the average number of ques-
tions voters are asked by the protocols on real data sets. P2 performs
better than P1 by asking 5–10% fewer questions. Both protocols are
much better than the worst-case analysis suggests, by about 40%.
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Figure 9: Average communication cost, real data
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Figure 10: Number of voters who were asked k questions,
Dublin data.
Figure 10 shows how many voters in Dublin were asked k ques-
tions under P1 and P2. Again, P2 outperforms P1. Results suggest
that almost half of the voters are asked to submit only their top
preferred candidate when using P2. In P1, it is more common to be
asked to submit two preferences.
6 CONCLUSION
Our results show that STV has low communication cost in practice,
either through using the STVk -rules of Section 3 or by using the
protocols of Section 4. Thus, the extra cost of eliciting full rankings
should not be an argument against replacing, say, plurality voting
by STV. In fact, the very low communication cost of STV might be
a reason to prefer it to other traditional voting rules, such as Borda.
A future direction is to consider STV in another incomplete
information context, namely vote streams, where voters arrive one
at a time [3, 9]. The key practical question is to decide when we
have enough information to eliminate one more candidate, so that
the next voters will have less information to communicate.
Session 4F: Communication and Argumentation 1  AAMAS 2019, May 13-17, 2019, Montréal, Canada
1295
REFERENCES
[1] J. Bartholdi, III and J. B. Orlin. 1991. Single transferable vote resists strategic
voting. Social Choice and Welfare 8, 4 (1991), 341–354.
[2] D. Baumeister, P. Faliszewski, J. Lang, and J. Rothe. 2012. Campaigns for lazy
voters: truncated ballots. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 577–584.
[3] A. Bhattacharyya and P. Dey. 2015. Fishing out Winners from Vote Streams.
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 22 (2015), 135.
[4] C. Boutilier and J. Rosenschein. 2016. Incomplete Information and Communica-
tion in Voting. In Handbook of Computational Social Choice, F. Brandt, V. Conitzer,
U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, Chap-
ter 10.
[5] V. Conitzer, M. Rognlie, and L. Xia. 2009. Preference functions that score rankings
and maximum likelihood estimation. In Proceedings of the 21st International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI). AAAI Press, 109–115.
[6] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. 2005. Communication Complexity of Common
Voting Rules. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(ACM-EC). ACM Press, 78–87.
[7] T. Csar, M. Lackner, R. Pichler, and E. Sallinger. 2017. Winner Determination in
Huge Elections with MapReduce. In Proceedings of the 31st AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). 451–458.
[8] L. N. Dery, M. Kalech, L. Rokach, and B. Shapira. 2014. Reaching a joint decision
with minimal elicitation of voter preferences. Information Sciences 278, 466–487.
[9] P. Dey, N. Talmon, and O. van Handel. 2017. Proportional representation in vote
streams. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 15–23.
[10] Y. Filmus and J. Oren. 2014. Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a
probabilistic approach. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics
and Computation (ACM-EC). ACM Press, 295–312.
[11] R. Freeman, M. Brill, and V. Conitzer. 2014. On the axiomatic characterization
of runoff voting rules. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI). AAAI Press, 675–681.
[12] C. Jiang, S. Sikdar, J. Wang, L. Xia, and Z. Zhao. 2017. Practical Algorithms for
Computing STV and Other Multi-Round Voting Rules. In EXPLORE-2017: The 4th
Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice.
[13] M. Kalech, S. Kraus, G. A. Kaminka, and C. V. Goldman. 2011. Practical voting
rules with partial information. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 22,
1, 151–182.
[14] J.-F. Laslier. 2016. Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of
‘sour grapes’ behavior. Homo Oeconomicus 33, 1 (2016), 57–76.
[15] T. Lu and C. Boutilier. 2011. Robust Approximation and Incremental Elicitation
in Voting Protocols. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI). AAAI Press, 287–293.
[16] T. Lu and C. Boutilier. 2011. Vote Elicitation with Probabilistic Preference Models:
Empirical Estimation and Cost Tradeoffs. In Proceedings of the 2nd International
Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT). Springer, 135–149.
[17] C. L. Mallows. 1957. Non-null ranking models. I. Biometrika (1957), 114–130.
[18] N. Mattei and T. Walsh. 2013. PrefLib: A Library for Preference Data. In Pro-
ceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT)
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)), Vol. 8176. Springer-Verlag, 259–270.
[19] L. Naamani-Dery, M. Kalech, L. Rokach, and B. Shapira. 2016. Reducing preference
elicitation in group decision making. Expert Systems with Applications 61 (2016),
246–261.
[20] J. Oren, Y. Filmus, and C. Boutilier. 2015. Efficient Vote Elicitation under Candidate
Uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI). AAAI Press, 309–316.
[21] T. C. Service and J. A. Adams. 2012. Communication complexity of approximating
voting rules. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 593–602.
[22] P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. 2015. Achieving fully proportional
representation: Approximability results. Artificial Intelligence 222 (2015), 67–103.
[23] T. N. Tideman. 1987. Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Social
Choice and Welfare 4, 3 (1987), 185–206.
[24] T. Walsh. 2010. An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable
Voting. In Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(ECAI). 257–262.
Session 4F: Communication and Argumentation 1  AAMAS 2019, May 13-17, 2019, Montréal, Canada
1296
